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Abstract. In theAVERssense-making tool for crime analysis different types of in-
formation are represented in different ways. More precisely, narrative knowledge
is represented in an explanatory direction and testimonialk owledge in an indica-
tive direction. This paper shows that this distinction agrees with the preference of
potential users and reduces the number of interpretation err rs made by them.
1. Introduction
Recently, we proposed theAVERs(Argument Visualization for Evidential Reasoning
based on stories) sense-making system for crime analysis, in which crime analysts can
manage and visualize the information available in a case andexpress the reasons why
certain pieces of evidence support or attack a certain hypotesis [1]. More precisely, in
AVERstwo kinds of knowledge about a case can be expressed, namely,‘narrative’ and
‘testimonial’ knowledge. The former contains elements that are used to construct stories
about what happened. The latter consists of information from testimonies, but also from
other evidential documents, which is used to support the elem nts of these stories.
While devising such a sense-making tool, a choice has to be mad regarding how the
different types of knowledge should be represented, since both can be represented in two
directions: anexplanatoryand anindicativedirection. For instance, narrative knowledge
about physical causation can be represented as ‘fire causes smoke’ (explanatory) and as
‘smoke indicates fire’ (indicative). Likewise, narrative knowledge about motivational at-
titudes and actions can be represented as ‘jealousness motivates violence against one’s
ex-partner’ (explanatory) and as ‘violence against one’s ex-partner indicates jealousness’
(indicative). The same also holds for testimonial knowledge. For example, the relation
between an event and a testimony about that event can be represented as ‘John’s obser-
vation of the event made John testify that he observed it’ (explanatory) and as ‘the fact
that John testified that he observed the event indicates thathe observed it’ (indicative).
Choosing between these two directions is a well-known issuein AI research on
knowledge representation [2,3]. Often a choice is made for aunique way to represent
1Corresponding Author: Susan van den Braak; E-mail: susanb@cs.uu.nl.
P shoots J [green] causes J dies [green]
(a) narrative knowledge displayed in the explanatory direction
Witness: "I saw that P shot J" [blue] is evidence for P shot J [green]
(b) testimonial knowledge displayed in the indicative direction
Figure 1. Narrative and testimonial information inAVERs
both kinds of knowledge. For example, in [3]’s application of his theorist system to a
criminal case both narrative and testimonial knowledge is rpresented in the explanatory
direction, while in [4]’s use of Wigmore charts both types are represented in the indica-
tive direction. However, in informal contacts with Dutch crime analysts we observed that
when analyzing a case they tend to prefer to represent the twokinds of knowledge in
different ways. They usually represent narrative knowledge in the form of time lines of
events and then hypothesize explanatory links between these events. In this way they try
to construct scenarios about what might have happened in a case. Subsequently, they try
to link the available testimonial evidence to the various events in the time line to express
how the testimonies support or discredit these events. Thus, t ey use the testimonial evi-
dence in testing the plausibility of a scenario. In line withthese observations, theAVERs
design supports the representation of the two kinds of knowledge in different directions:
the explanatory direction for narrative knowledge and the indicative direction for testi-
monial knowledge (see Figure 1). The reasoning model underlying the narrative part is
abductive inference to the best explanation while the reasoning model for the testimo-
nial part is argumentation with argument schemes [5]. In [6]it is described how formal
versions of these two reasoning models can be combined.
While there are thus good reasons forAVERs’ combined approach, it has not yet
been tested whether this approach agrees with the intuitions of the potential users of
the software. It is well-known that to be usable in practice th software’s underlying
assumptions should be as natural as possible [7]. Therefore, in this paper an experiment
is presented in whichAVERs’ knowledge representation scheme was tested by users of
the software. In this experiment it was investigated whether us rs are able to recognize
and interpret both types of knowledge. Moreover, it was examined whether they have a
preference for the one or the other direction to represent a cert in type of information,
and whether their behavior concurs with the underlying assumptions ofAVERs.
This study consisted of two parts. In the first part, the participants had to interpret
different relations and had to express their intuitions. They ad to do that for graphical
representations of both narrative and testimonial knowledge. We predict that if people
are able to distinguish between the two types of knowledge, they will be able to correctly
interpret both types of representations, but when they do not really differentiate the two
types, they will confuse their interpretations. Furthermoe, we expect that diagrams that
are inverted, that is, in which the direction of the relations opposite to the order pro-
posed inAVERs, will be harder to interpret, but still if people are able to distinguish the
two types, they will not confuse them. In the second part, thestudents had to express
their preference for a certain direction to represent narrative nd testimonial information.
We expect that they will have a preference for the indicativedir ction for testimonial
information, while for narrative information they will prefer the explanatory direction.
This paper addresses a practical problem in the context of the development of
AVERs, namely, that of finding a knowledge representation that is natural to crime ana-
lysts. The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the experimen-
tal design. Subsequently, Sections 3 and 4 report on the results of the two parts of the
study. Finally, a conclusion summarizes and discusses the results and points out topics
for future research.
2. Method
The main purpose of the study was to test the validity of the assumption underlying
AVERs. This was done by showing diagrams, as could be produced withAVERs, that dis-
play either narrative or testimonial information (later referred to as ‘narrative diagrams’
and ‘testimonial diagrams’ respectively). The participants were then asked to interpret
these diagrams and to select their preference for a direction to express such information.
Participants 14 law students participated in a one-hour session. Additionally, 13 PhD
students with a Master’s degree in law completed the questionnaire during individual
sessions in their office (in totalN = 27).
Materials and procedure The questionnaire was handed to the participants on paper
and they were asked to complete all questions individually.Three versions of the ques-
tionnaire were constructed in which the order of the question was varied. The partic-
ipants were instructed to complete the questions in the order in which they were pre-
sented to them and were not allowed to glance forward or to corre t previous answers.
The procedure consisted of three parts. First, the participants received a brief general
introduction and the aim of the experiment was described. Subsequently, the experiment
started with12 diagrams which had to be interpreted by the participants (see for more
details Section 3). Note that these questions were answeredithout any prior instruction
about the direction of relations, such that the answers reflect d the participants’ true in-
tuitions about the meaning of the displayed relations. After this part, the students were
given a short explanation of the two directions in which information may be presented.
Subsequently, for27 diagrams they were asked to select the direction they preferred for
the displayed information (see further Section 4).
3. Interpreting narrative and testimonial diagrams
In the first part of the experiment, six narrative and six testimonial diagrams were pre-
sented to the participants. For each type, four diagrams were in the normal direction, that
is, in the explanatory direction for narrative and in the indicative direction for testimo-
nial diagrams, while two of them were in the opposite direction. The participants were
asked to write down a label which, according to them, described the nature of the dis-
played relation. In this way, the participants were asked toverbalize their intuitions and
interpretations of the situation. Examples of all diagram types are displayed in Figure 2.
P shoots at J [green] ...... J is hit by a bullet [green]
(a) narrative diagram
P shoots at J [green]J is hit by a bullet [green] ......
(b) inverted narrative diagram
Witness testimony W: "I saw that P went into 
 a store and came out with a weapon" [blue]
...... P bought a weapon [green]
(c) testimonial diagram
Witness testimony W: "I saw that P went into 
 a store and came out with a weapon" [blue]
P bought a weapon [green] ......
(d) inverted testimonial diagram
Figure 2. Examples of the diagram types that needed to be interpreted
To obtain a quantitative measure of the interpretations of the participants, the labels
written down by the participants were rated along three categori s, namely, explanatory,
indicative, and rest. A precise description of the scheme that was used to categorize the
answers is included in [8]. For all narrative and testimonial d grams the frequencies of
the labels fitting into the explanatory and indicative categories were counted. For both
diagram types the maximum frequency was thus4 per participant, since there were four
diagrams per type. The inverted (narrative and testimonial) d grams were scored in a
similar matter, where for both types the maximum frequency was2.
3.1. Hypotheses
We predicted that normal diagrams would be interpreted in their ‘correct’ direction, while
inverted diagrams would be harder to interpret and were moreoften interpreted in the
‘wrong’ direction. More specifically, we predicted that theinterpretations of narrative
diagrams were in the explanatory category and those of testimonial diagrams in the in-
dicative category. Additionally, we predicted that the inverted narrative diagrams were
interpreted in the indicative category, while the invertedt stimonial diagrams were inter-
preted in the explanatory category, but that more mistakes would be made with them.
To test this, half of the maximum frequency was taken as the test value. If a fre-
quency equal to this value is obtained, this means that half of the labels is in the predicted
group, while the other half is in the other categories. To show that at least more than half
of the diagrams were interpreted in the predicted categories, th null hypothesis that the
mean population frequency is equal to this test value had to be tested, so:
H0: There is no significant difference between the test value and the population mean
(µnormal narrative (the mean population frequency on normal narrative diagrams)=
2, µnormal testimonial = 2, µinverted narrative = 1, andµinverted testimonial = 1)
The alternative hypothesis, which we would like to be supported is:
HA: The population mean frequency is significantly higher thanthe test value,
implying that the participants give an explanatory interprtation to narrative dia-
grams and inverted testimonial diagrams and a indicative interpretation to testimonial
and inverted narrative diagrams (µnormal narrative > 2, µnormal testimonial > 2,
µinverted narrative > 1, andµinverted testimonial > 1).
3.2. Results
Table 1 displays the results of the summarization of the labels, produced by the partici-
pants, into the three categories per question. Note that these results are ordered according
to diagram type and subsequently on frequency from high to low (the diagram with the
highest number of ‘correct’ interpretations first). These results show that on the one hand,
for normal narrative and inverted narrative diagrams all interpretations were in only one
category (the explanatory category for normal narrative and the indicative category for
inverted narrative diagrams) and that for normal testimonial diagrams all but one inter-
pretation was indicative. On the other hand, for the inverted testimonial diagrams there
was more diversity: most interpretations were explanatory, but some were indicative.
These observations are confirmed by the test results in Table2, which shows that the
mean frequency of inverted testimonial diagrams was lower than of the other diagrams.
The “95% confidence interval” designates the interval which covers the true value of each
Table 1. Frequencies of the classification of the labels into the categori s explanatory, indicative, and rest (the
maximum frequency was27)
Interpretation
Q. Type Description Exp. Ind. Rest
b9 narrative P shoots atJ → J is hit by a bullet 24 − 3
b5 narrative T drops a glass→ The glass is broken 23 − 4
b11 narrative J is hit by a bullet→ J is dead 23 − 4
b6 narrative K throws the ball atM → M catches the
ball
22 − 5
b4 inverted narrative (b5) The glass is broken→ T dropped the glass − 23 4
b10 inverted narrative (b9) J is hit by a bullet→ P shoots atJ − 19 8
b7 testimonial Witness testimonyW “I saw that P went
into a store and came out with a weapon”→
P bought a weapon
− 23 4
b3 testimonial Witness: “I saw a flying penguin”→ At least
one penguin can fly
− 21 6
b12 testimonial Report coroner: “This man died because of a
shot wound to his head”→ J died because
of a head wound
1 18 8
b1 testimonial Expert: “Penguins usually cannot fly”→
Penguins cannot fly
− 15 12
b2 inverted testimonial (b1) Penguins cannot fly→ Expert: Penguins
usually cannot fly
15 3 9
b8 inverted testimonial (b7) P bought a weapon→ Witness testimony W
“I saw thatP went into a store and came out
with a weapon”
15 6 6















2 2.98 < µ < 3.84 .000 1.56
(.64)
1 1.30 < µ < 1.81 .000
testimonial 2.85
(1.17)
2 2.39 < µ < 3.31 .001 1.11
(0.80)
1 0.79 < µ < 1.43 .477
sum 6.26
(1.99)
4 5.47 < µ < 7.05 .000 2.67
(1.04)
2 2.26 < µ < 3.08 .003
measure with a probability of95%. So, for instance, with a probability of95% we can
say that the true value ofµnormal Xnarrative lies between2.98 and3.84 (with a mean of
3.41). This table also displays the results of the one-samplet-tests that were performed
to test whether the mean population frequency was equal to the test value. For the normal
diagrams and the inverted narrative diagrams, the frequencies were significantly higher
than the test value. The frequency on the inverted testimonial diagrams was also higher
than the test value, but this difference was not significant (p = .48).
On a more detailed level, the participants performed betteron some questions than
on others (see Table 1). These results also show that the inverted t stimonial diagrams
were the hardest to interpret (15 participants per question produced a explanatory label),
while some of the normal testimonial diagrams were among theeasiest questions. Re-
markably, the participants performed quite well on the diagram “Witness testimonyW :
‘I saw thatP went into a store and came out with a weapon”→ P bought a weapon”
(b7), while on its inversion (b8) they performed worst. Some of the participants read the
inverted diagram from right to left, saying that the right box is evidence for the left box;
this shows that they would prefer the diagram to be in the normal, indicative direction.
The same holds for the other inverted testimonial diagram (b2), but to a lesser degree.
For narrative diagrams the difference between normal and inverted diagrams was not that
clear, as the participants performed as well on the inverteddiagram “The glass is broken”
→ “T dropped the glass” (b4) as on its original (b5).
In sum, these results indicate that people are able to understand narrative diagrams
in both directions, while for testimonial information the direction is important and in-
verting the direction may impede the understanding of the reader. At first sight this might
suggest that only the indicative direction is needed to represent both types of knowledge.
However, for narrative information the inversion of the direction (into the indicative di-
rection) is not justified in cases where the cause is not the normal cause (e.g. “a smoke
machine causes smoke”). Therefore, both directions are needed to correctly represent
both types of knowledge.
4. Preference for directions to represent narrative and testimonial information
In the second part of the experiment, three example criminalcases were presented to
the participant. Each case consisted of a short introduction, followed by four testimonial
diagrams, four narrative diagrams, and one story diagram (which was a chaining of the
P buys a gun [green] explains
Witness testimony: 
 "I saw that P bought a gun J" [blue]
Witness testimony: 
 "I saw that P bought a gun J" [blue]
is evidence for P buys a gun [green]
Figure 3. Example of a question where the participants had to choose a dir ction for testimonial knowledge
narrative diagrams). This means that there were nine (4 + 4 + 1) diagrams per case, so
in total there were27 (9 × 3) diagrams in this part of the experiment. For each case the
procedure was as follows.
First, the participants received a short introduction and information about the actions
taken by the police. An example is displayed below (translated from the Dutch original):
Suppose that the following events occurred. A man J was shot,the police finds P, who
is acting suspiciously, near the crime scene. The police taks the following actions:
• Samples are taken from P’s hands
• P is body-searched
• Witnesses are heard
• The body is examined by a coroner
Subsequently, the participants were confronted with testimonial diagrams that repre-
sented the pieces of evidence and their relation to the supported event. For every piece of
evidence the relation with the event was displayed in both the explanatory and indicative
direction. The participants were asked to choose the direction that they preferred (see
Figure 3). Next, a possible story of the police was presentedto them:
From the information found the police reconstructs what might have happened, which
results in the following story: P bought a gun and shot J, J washit in the head and
died because of this.
Thereupon, narrative diagrams which displayed relations between two events of the
story were presented. These relations were also displayed in both directions, and again
the participants had to select their preferred direction. An example question is displayed
in Figure 4. Additionally, the participants had to indicateth ir preferred direction for a
diagram that represented the complete story.
In order to obtain a measure for the preference direction of the participants, for all
narrative and all story diagrams the number of times the explanatory direction was se-
lected was summed, while for all testimonial diagrams the number of times the indica-
tive direction was preferred was counted. This means that for narrative and testimonial
P shoots at J [green] explains J is hit in the head [green]
J is hit in the head [green] is evidence for P shot at J [green]
Figure 4. Example of a question where the participants had to choose a dir ction for narrative knowledge
diagrams the maximum frequency per participant was12 (since there were12 diagrams
for both types) and that for story diagrams the maximum was3.
4.1. Hypotheses
We predicted that there would be a preference for the explanatory direction for narrative
and story diagrams and for the indicative direction for the testimonial diagrams, which
means that the choices of the participants were not random. Nw, suppose that the choice
was random, then the frequencies on all diagrams would be half of their maximum (since
there were only two options): this is what was used as the testvalue which is the value
(frequency) that is expected if the participants’ preference is based on randomness, that
is, if there is no real preference. To disprove the claim thate choice was random, the
null hypothesis that the mean population frequency is equalto this test value had to be
tested, so:
H0: There is no significant difference between the test value and the mean population
frequency (µnarrative = 6, µstory = 1.5, µtestimonial = 6, andµtotal = 13.5).
The alternative hypothesis, which we would like to be supported is:
HA: The mean population frequency is significantly higher thanthe test value, such
that there is a preference for the explanatory direction fornar ative and story dia-
grams (µnarrative > 6 andµstory > 1.5) and a preference for the indicative direction
for testimonial diagrams (µtestimonial > 6 andµtotal > 13.5).
Single samplet-tests were used to determine whether the observed frequencies were
indeed different from these test values.
4.2. Results
Table 3 shows that all mean population frequencies were significa tly higher than the test
value. This means that for testimonial diagrams there was a preference for the indicative
direction and that for narrative and story diagrams the preference was in the explanatory
direction.
Also in this part there were differences between the question (see Table 4). For
most testimonial diagrams there was a clear preference for the indicative direction, but
for diagramc4 the preference was clearly in the other direction. The comments of the
participants to their answers showed that the main reason for the them to choose the in-
dicative direction for testimonial diagrams was the beliefthat a witness testimony is a
good indication for the event, but no absolute proof; the relation involves some uncer-
tainty. This explains why for the diagram “Report medical examiner: ‘This manJ was
hit in his head’→ J was hit in the head” (c4) the opposite, explanatory direction was
Table 3. Mean population frequencies and results of thet-t sts
Diagram Mean Test value 95% Confidence interval p
narrative 7.48 (SD = 2.55) 6 6.47 < µ < 8.49 .003
story 2.30 (SD = 0.91) 1.5 1.94 < µ < 2.66 .000
testimonial 9.19 (SD = 3.11) 6 7.95 < µ < 10.42 .000
total 18.96 (SD = 5.44) 13.5 16.81 < µ < 21.11 .000
Table 4. Frequencies of preference for the predicted direction (themaximum frequency was27)
Q. Type Description Freq.
c10 testimonial Witness testimony: “I saw thatN took the bike of Mrs.K” is evidence for
N stole the bike ofK
25
c1 testimonial Report laboratory: “P has gunshot residue on his hands”is evidence forP
shot a gun
23
c12 testimonial Testimony girlfriendis evidence forN stoleK ’s bike 23
c2 testimonial Witness testimony: “I saw thatP bought a gun”is evidence forP buys a
gun
22
c21 testimonial Police file: “R’s previous convictions for selling drugs”is evidence forR
is involved in selling drugs
22
c22 testimonial Testimony bank: “R tried to deposit large sums of money”is evidence for
R conducts suspicious transactions
22
c19 testimonial Excerpt BKR (Credit Information Bureau)is evidence forR has debts 21
c11 testimonial Testimony girlfriend: “N needed a bike, because his own bike was broken”
is evidence forN wanted to have a bike
21
c13 testimonial GPS signal: “The bike is inN ’s backyard”is evidence forN put the bike
in his backyard
20
c20 testimonial Telephone tap;R says toF “I need money”is evidence forR needs money 19
c3 testimonial Testimony police officer: “I found a gun inP ’s pocket” is evidence forP
owns a gun
18
c4 testimonial Report coroner: “This manJ is hit in the head”is evidence forJ is hit in
the head
12
c7 narrative P shoots atJ explainsJ is hit in the head 22
c8 narrative J is hit in the headexplainsJ is dead 22
c14 narrative N wants to have a bikexplainsN stealsK ’s bike 21
c5 narrative P buys a gunexplainsP owns a gun 20
c15 narrative N does not have money to buy a new bikeexplainsN stealsK ’s bike 18
c24 narrative R needs moneyexplainsR is selling drugs 18
c26 narrative R receives large sums of moneyxplainsR launders money 17
c23 narrative R has debtsexplainsR needs money 16
c25 narrative R sells drugsexplainsR receives large sums of money 16
c16 narrative N stealsK ’s bike explainsN owns the bike 13
c17 narrative N owns the bikeexplainsN puts the bike in his backyard 11
c6 narrative P owns a gunexplainsP shoots atJ 8
c18 story Story aboutK ’s stolen bike 25
c9 story Story about the death ofJ 19
c27 story Story aboutR selling drugs 18
preferred, as such an expert is believed to be more credible,reliable, and objective than
normal witnesses: it is perceived as being hard evidence andas a result there is no need
to “keep more options open”. The same counts (but to a lesser degree) for diagramc3,
which involves the statement of a police man. For narrative dagrams the results were
more diverse: the preference for some diagrams was clearly in the explanatory direction,
but for others the preference was in the opposite direction (cf. c6, c17 andc16). This
concurs with the results found on the first part of the experimnt, where it was found that
for narrative relations the direction is not that important.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, the analyses presented in this paper indicate th amongst law students for
narrative information there is a preference for the explanatory direction and that for tes-
timonial information the preference is in the indicative direction. The results found also
suggest that they are making a conscious choice for one of thedirections, based on the
nature of the represented information. The data thus suggest that the underlying assump-
tions ofAVERsagree with the intuitions of potential users of the system and that the pro-
posed combined model is natural and leads to less errors on their part. However, future
research has to show whether this is also the case for a largerpopulation of participants,
and in addition wether it also holds for crime analysts.
The knowledge representation ofAVERswas tested in a way that examined only the
way in which produced diagrams are read and interpreted. Thestudy presented in this
paper did not take into account the fact that one of the most important tasks of potential
users of the system is to construct their own diagrams. Therefore, in future research we
will let users draw diagrams and investigate whether the proposed model allows them to
produce diagrams that comply with their expectations and intentions.
So, while the cognitive preferences of the potential users of sense-making tools are
not studied all too often, this paper accounts for a first attempt to provide such an evalu-
ation. It presented a method of how to conduct such research together with some prelim-
inary results that are valuable in the light of the further development ofAVERs.
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